Natural, Preternatural, and Supernatural
In the early sixteenth century the received views on miracles, marvels, and their relationship to the natural order still derived principally from the teachings of Augustine, and, especially, from those of Thomas Aquinas. These authorities were sometimes difficult to square with one another. Augustine praised all of nature as a miracle, and complained that familiarity with such marvels as the individuality of each and every human being had unduly blunted our sense of wonder. Since nature was simply the will of God realized, it made no sense to speak of miracles as contra naturam: "For how can anything done by the will of God be contrary to nature, when the will of so great a creator constitutes the nature of each created thing?"' Marvels shaded into miracles without a sharp break for Augustine, for both testified to how far the power of God exceeded that of God performs miracles for an audience, which credits them in proportion to the wonder they excite, which wonder in turn measures the magnitude of the audience's ignorance. Miracles convert and convince by their psychological effects; they are God's oratory.
Like Augustine, Aquinas often blurred the boundary between the marvelous and the miraculous, albeit for different reasons. For Augustine, especially in his earlier writings, there existed in principle no sharp distinction between the marvelous and the miraculous (and for that matter, the natural as well), for all sprang directly from God. Augustine was largely unconcerned with how God brings about these effects, much less with orders of causation.
Aquinas, in contrast, drew a principled distinction between the truly supernatural (God's unmediated actions) on the one hand, and the natural (what happens always or most of the time) and the preternatural (what happens rarely, but nonetheless by the agency of created beings), on the other. Marvels belong, properly speaking, to the realm of the preternatural:
For the order imposed on things by God is in keeping with that which is wont to occur in things for the most part, but it is not everywhere in keeping with what always occurs: because many natural causes produce their effects in the same way usually, but not always; since sometimes, though seldom, it happens otherwise, whether on account of a defect in the power of an agent, or through the indisposition of the matter, or by reason of a stronger agency: as when nature produces a sixth finger in a man.7 Not only unaided nature, but created spirits such as angels and demons can produce preternatural effects, although these fall short of true miracles on ontological grounds: spirits must work "through the local movement of a body," for God alone can "induce any form into corporeal matter, as though matter were in this obedient thereto." However, we humans are hard put to separate the supernatural wheat from the preternatural chaff, for both excite wonder when we are ignorant of the causes, and wonder is the hallmark of the miraculous.8
As one might expect in a body of beliefs discussed and elaborated over a millennium, medieval views on the relationships between the natural, preternatural, and supernatural were by no means monolithic, and it is possible to find many variants on and exceptions to both the Augustinian and Thomist views, not to mention tensions between the two. The medieval Christian doctrine of miracles was further complicated by the heterogeneity of the category: not only scriptural miracles, but also the 7. Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 57. 8. Ibid., vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 65-66. miracles of saints and their shrines and relics, the miracles of the sacraments, the miracles of judicial ordeals (at least until their abolition by the fourth Lateran Council in 1215), the historical miracles recounted by the chronicles, and the "jocular" miracles inserted in sermons all had to be subsumed therein, and the conceptual integrity of the category suffered accordingly.9
Nonetheless, the general outlines of the doctrine as it crystallized in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries can be discerned with some clarity. First, there was a tendency, always present among theologians and increasingly pronounced after the Aristotelian synthesis of the thirteenth century, to segregate the natural and the preternatural from the supernatural, having recourse to the latter only as a last resort. Second, although theologians followed Aquinas in principle by defining miracles by the abrogation of the lower order of causes, they also followed him in practice by making universal wonderment the actual criterion. Third, despite the ensuing practical difficulties of distinguishing between the preternatural marvel and the supernatural miracle, theologians nonetheless continued to insist on the theoretical distinction between the two.
This distinction was fortified in the sixteenth century, when the preternatural came to be ever more closely associated with the dubious and possibly demonic activities of magic and divination.'0 Because of these demonic associations some historians have assumed that medieval theologians deemed theurgy to be supernatural, but this does not do justice to the nicety of the conceptual distinctions that reserved the supernatural for God alone. Although demons, astral intelligences, and other spirits might manipulate natural causes with superhuman dexterity and thereby work marvels, as mere creatures they could never transcend from the preternatural to the supernatural and work genuine miracles. Well into the seventeenth century and beyond, sober thinkers warned against the counterfeit miracles of Satan, who "being a natural Magician ... may perform many acts in ways above our knowledge, though not transcending our natural power."" Theology cemented the barrier between the preternatural and the supernatural; scholastic natural philosophy erected a similar barrier between the preternatural and the natural. The natural order itself was a matter of nature's habitual custom rather than of nature's inviolable law, what usually rather than what infallibly happened.12 Although scientia properly so called dealt in demonstration and therefore in what must be the case, it did not pretend to be comprehensive. There were pockets of experience that defied necessity, and therefore scientific treatment. Magnetism, the virtue of coral to ward off lightning, the antipathy between elephant and dragon-few doubted the existence of such phenomena, but because their occult (that is, "hidden") causes were inaccessible to sense and reason, they formed no part of natural philosophy.'3 Indeed, particulars and a fortiori singularities of all kinds, whether ascribed to occult causes or to chance, were not readily susceptible to scientific explanation, which trafficked in universals and regularities: Aquinas thought the study of singulars in ethics, alchemy, and medicine might at best approximate but never attain scientific certitude.'4 Thus even strange or singular phenomena without the slightest whiff of the demonic were effectively excluded from the natural, by dint of being excluded from natural philosophy. Although preternatural phenomena were in theory difficult to distinguish from natural events (since they belonged to the same, lower order of causation), and in practice difficult to distinguish from supernatural events (since they evoked the same astonishment and wonder), they nonetheless constituted a third ontological domain until the late seventeenth century.
It might be argued that the inherent conceptual instability of the category of preternatural phenomena predestined it for collapse into the sturdier categories of the natural and supernatural. However, the preternatural was very long in meeting its doom, not only resisting attempts to absorb it into the natural and into the supernatural, but also expanding in extent and intellectual importance throughout the sixteenth century. Fifty years before its demise around the turn of the eighteenth century, the preternatural preoccupied theologians and natural philosophers more urgently than ever before.
The early modern vogue for the preternatural arose from a confluence of circumstances: Marsilio Ficino's revival of magic, both natural and demonic, imbued scholarly Neoplatonism with a strong affinity for the occult;'5 the new printing centers north and south of the Alps spewed out edition after edition of books of secrets retailing household recipes, virtues of herbs and stones, tricks of the trades, and "natural magic";'6 the witchcraft trials concentrated theological and legal attention on the precise nature of demonic meddling in human affairs; 7 the voyages of exploration brought back tales and trophies of creatures and landscapes more marvelous than anything in Pliny or Mandeville;'8 the religious and political upheavals set in motion by the Reformation also triggered an avalanche of crude broadsides and learned Latin treatises that anxiously interpreted comets, monstrous births, rains of blood, and any number of other strange phenomena as portents.19 Although portents were the very prototype of signifying events, spectacular and unsettling messages sent by God to herald triumph or catastrophe, it was this last category of portents and prodigies that ultimately supplied reforming natural philosophers of the seventeenth century with a new kind of fact that signified nothing at all.
The Naturalization of the Preternatural
Not all preternatural events qualified as portents or prodigies. Medieval chroniclers enlivened their accounts with comets, earthquakes, monstrous births, and the like, and often, but not always, speculated on their significance. For example, Gerald of Wales in his Topographia hibernia (ca. 1185) allows that some strange events may be portents, such as a large fish with three gold teeth caught two years before the arrival of the English, which might "prefigure the imminent conquest of the country," but he records many others-a ship-swallowing whirlpool, a Limerick woman with a beard and a mane-without interpretation. 20 The difficulty in interpreting preternatural events as divine signs was twofold: first, their ambiguous status between natural and supernatural; Although bona fide miracles were always missives from God-signs of divine power, intent, approval or disapproval-establishing their bona fides was in practice a delicate matter of balancing theological context against admittedly incomplete natural knowledge. This balancing act became increasingly precarious in the early modern period, when heterodox sects, reformed natural philosophy, and fear of demonic deception forced a reexamination of the definition and function of miracles.
Both context and the possibility2l of a natural explanation determined which preternatural events counted as signs: in a time of plague, war, or religious schism, the two-headed cat or shooting star that might have otherwise aroused only mild interest as a wonder provoked anxious interpretations as a portent. The interpretations of portents also teetered dangerously close to divination, which (except for predictions based on natural signs-for example, a red sky in the morning presages a storm at sea) was regularly and emphatically condemned from the twelfth century on by the Catholic church as a usurpation of God's perogative to foretell the future. Prodigies were in principle exempt from the ban on divination, as were visitations from God, angels, or saints in dreams, but in practice the distinction was difficult to maintain.22
In the latter half of the sixteenth century religious and political turmoil combined with an intense intellectual interest in the preternatural, first, to magnify the portentous associations of strange events and, second, to provoke ever more concerted attempts to distinguish genuine (that is, divine) portents from demonic counterfeits and superstitious divination. into service as propaganda on one or another side of the raging religious controversies of the day.29
However, the printed collections of prodigies, learned and lay alike, did not saddle every prodigy they reported with a portentous interpretation. Some might be signs either of impending events (an invasion of Turks, an outbreak of plague, the coming of the Messiah), or religious heresy, or more generally of God's wrath and power-but not all. Bodin believed only comets and monsters to be true portents, and took care to distinguish these from superstitious and impious divination.30 Boaistuau and his coauthors blithely related prodigies that testified to "the excellence of man" (a man who slept for thirty years, another who washed his face and hands with molten lead, women who had borne litters of children, a prodigiously obese man) and to the fecundity of nature (stones that could render brackish water sweet, nereids and tritons, volcanoes), rather than to divinejudgements and messages. Even the German broadsides, generally the gloomiest of a gloom-and-doom genre, sometimes published simple descriptions, without interpretations. Sixteenth-century demonology briefly reinforced this phenomenological homogeneity with a causal unity of sorts. Increasingly, preternatural events were attributed not just to any remarkable conjunction of natural causes, but to conjunctions of natural causes cunningly wrought by demons. The effect of such demonic attributions was to weaken ties not only with purely natural explanations but also with purely supernatural ones. Indeed, the latter tendency was the more pronounced, for the religious peril of becoming a dupe to a counterfeit miracle, staged by the Nor were these worries about how to distinguish preternatural, demonic wonders from supernatural, divine miracles confined to English Protestants: a Sieur de Sainte-Foy (possibly the pseudonym for the Jesuit Pere Annat) insinuated that the Port-Royal miracle of the Sacred Thorn was a false miracle, the work of demons manipulating subtle natural causes in order to mislead good Catholics into the Jansenist heresy.36 French Catholic writers on demonic imposture, however, did tend to concentrate more on superstitions like divination than on portents, possibly because they were saddled with the additional task of keeping sacramental as well as revelatory miracles pure from the taint of demonic imposture.37
The proximate impact of these warnings was to discredit preternatural phenomena as true signs from on high; they were rather to be rejected as forgeries from below. The ultimate impact was to naturalize almost all of them, even when natural explanations for specific cases were wanting, as was the rule rather than the exception. The writings of the demonologists show that it was not sufficient simply to posit natural causes for preternatural phenomena in order to naturalize them fully; it was also necessary to rid nature of demonic agency. To simplify the historical sequence somewhat: first, preternatural phenomena were demonized and thereby incidentally naturalized; then the demons were deleted, leaving only the natural causes. This two-step process should not be insisted on too adamantly: there were plenty of respectable theologians, both Protestant and Catholic, who invoked demonic plots well into the eighteenth century. In general, however, the activities and autonomy of the devil declined steadily in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, for reasons I shall discuss in part 5. The overall thrust of attempts to demonize preternatural phenomena was to discredit them as true signs. Counterfeit portents and false miracles pretended to a status they did not deserve, namely, that of the "signs and wonders" (Heb. 2:4) that truly announce God's will and doctrine.
While miracles became ever more closely associated with evidence, especially in the writings of late seventeenth-century Protestant theologians, preternatural phenomena became ever less so. The English HebraistJohn Spencer, writing in 1665, condemned the belief that prodigies were portents as "a very Vulgar and Pernicious Error," endangering philosophy by inhibiting the search for natural causes, corrupting divinity by allowing "a liberty for men to bring into it what Divine signs they please without warrant from Scripture or reason," and undermining the state by giving "every pitiful Prodigy-monger ... credit enough with the People" to gainsay authority "by telling them that heaven frowns upon the laws, and that God writes his displeasure against them in black and visible Characters when some sad accident befals the complyers with them." Spencer did blame the devil for fobbing off prodigies as miracles in an attempt to deceive the gullible, but he was at least as concerned about the human manipulation of such alleged signs for nefarious purposes.38 Meric Casaubon was willing to allow for sincere (though mistaken) claims to the power of divination, suggesting that "many natural things before they come to that passe, as to be generally known or visible, have some kind of obscure beginnings, by which they be known by some long before." People or animals with unusually acute senses may indeed foretell coming events by these "natural foregoing signes."39 Although these indicators were in Casaubon's view genuine signs, they were neither supernatural nor preternatural, but prosaically natural-for example, the throbbing bunions that precede a storm.40
From Signs to Facts
Thus did preternatural phenomena lose their religious meaning as signs. But they did not cease to be of interest for learned as well as for lay audiences. Not only did vernacular collections of prodigies, now frankly advertised as "pregnant with pleasure and delight," continue to spill forth Bacon's grounds for studying the preternatural were metaphysical as well as epistemological. Although he still spoke the language of "nature in course" and "nature erring," he also initiated a unified and thoroughgoing determinism. Dissolving the ontological barriers between natural and artificial, and between natural and preternatural, Bacon insisted that natural philosophy explain all such phenomena, and all by appeal to the same kind of causes. In particular, marvels and prodigies were no longer exempted from scientific explanation: "Nor should we desist from inquiry, until the properties and qualities of those things, which may be deemed miracles, as it were, of nature, be reduced to, and comprehended in, some form or certain law; so that all irregularity or singularity may be found to depend on some common form" (NO, 14:137/ii. 29). A due attention to preternatural phenomena would also act as an epistemological brake to over-hasty axioms and, Bacon further believed, offer privileged insights into the essential but often hidden workings of nature; they would "reveal common forms" as well as "rectify the understanding in opposition to common habit" (NO, 14:138/ii. 29).
Baconian facts were new not because they were particulars, nor even because they were preternatural. Particulars were the stuff of history, natural and civil, and expressly preternatural particulars had been a staple of both sorts of history since Herodotus and Pliny.53 They were new because they now belonged to natural philosophy, expanding its realm beyond the universal and the commonplace. Within natural philosophy they supplemented the empiricism of examples used to confirm and instruct with a collection of counterexamples that were a standing reproach to all extant theories. Indeed, Baconian facts were handpicked for their recalcitrance, anomalies that undermined superficial classifications and exceptions that broke glib rules. This is why the first scientific facts retailed in the annals of the Royal Society of London and the Paris Academie des Sciences were often such strange ones, for natural philosophy required the shock of repeated contact with the bizarre, the heteroclite, and the singular in order to sunder the age-old link between "a datum of experience" and "the conclusions that may be based on it"; in other words, to sunder facts from evidence. Thus in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries preternatural phenomena swung from the almost-supernatural extreme of portents to the almost-natural extreme of Baconian facts. They began as signs par excellence and ended as stubbornly insignificant. The crucial step in this astonishing transformation was the naturalization of preternatural phenomena. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that Spencer, Casaubon, and others who attacked the portentous interpretation of prodigies were always or even usually asserting the autonomy and inviolability of natural laws, a la David Hume. First, these so-called naturalizers countenanced the most unnatural of natural causes in their attempts to debunk false miracles. Pietro Pomponazzi's De naturalium effectuum causis; sive, De incantationibus (1556) explained putative miraculous cures and apparitions by causes almost as wondrous: occult virtues of animals, plants, and humans; astral influences; the power of the imagination on animate and inanimate bodies.54 Bacon was equally willing to grasp at the imagination as a natural alternative to a supernatural explanation. Reviewing stories about corpses bleeding anew in the presence of their murderers, he commented: "It may be, that this participateth of a miracle, by God's just judgment, who usually bringeth murders to light: but if it be natural, it must be referred to imagination."55 Second, the structure of natural causes was not always mechanical or even deterministic. Spencer, for example, invoked the metaphor of natural law, but so literally that nature, like human legislators, was granted considerable freedom to make exceptions: "the more private and common Laws of Motion" only hold until superseded by "some more catholick and indispensable Laws ... as the Statutes and Customs of private Corporations take place, till their power be suspended by some more catholick and inforcing Law of State" (DCP, p. 5). Similarly, when he likened nature to clockwork, it was a mechanism whose "blind and decaying Powers must be managed and perpetually woond up by an Hand of Power and Counsel, or they will either stand still, or perform their motions without time and method" (DCP, p. 136).
Thirdly, a natural explanation did not always preclude a preternatural or supernatural one. The cause of a monstrous birth might be both the bestiality of the parents and divine displeasure at such sinful acts.56 The doctrine of providence was based on the assumption that primary and secondary causes sometimes worked in tandem to "bring about striking accidents or coincidences."57 Natural philosophers from Jean Buridan through John Evelyn believed that comets were due to natural causes and foretold the death of kings. Since God controlled the natural and moral orders, there was no reason for him not to synchronize them.58 Thus sixteenth-and seventeenth-century naturalism was synonymous neither with strict mechanical materialism nor with ironclad determinism nor with the autonomy of secondary causes. The impulses that eventually made it so were as much political and theological as philosophical, as the debate over the evidence of miracles reveals.
The Pure Evidence of Miracles
The idealized miracle of the seventeenth-century theologians takes place in the pages of Bacon's unfinished utopia, The New Atlantis. The governor of the island of Bensalem explains to his shipwrecked guests how the islanders were converted to Christianity by "a great pillar of light," topped by a still-brighter cross at sea, which one of the wise men of Solomon's House certified as a genuine heavenly sign with the following prayer: "Lord God of heaven and earth, thou hast vouchsafed of thy grace, to those of our order, to know thy works of creation, and the secrets of them; and to discern, as far as appertaineth to the generations of men, between divine miracles, works of nature, works of art, and impostures and illusions of all sorts. I do here acknowledge and testify before this people, that the thing which we now see before our eyes, is thy finger, and a true miracle; and forasmuch as we learn in our books, that thou never workest miracles, but to a divine and excellent end, for the laws of nature are thine own laws, and thou exceedest them not but upon great cause, we most humbly beseech thee to prosper this great sign, and to give us the interpretation and use of it in mercy; which thou dost in some part secretly promise by sending it unto us."59 This fictional (and atypical, since unrelated to healing) miracle includes almost all of the elements that preoccupied seventeenth-century writers on miracles. First, the miracle is a public rather than a private sign, on display for all the people of Bensalem to inspect and wonder at. Tradi- However, the evidence of miracles was more than a spectacular appeal to the senses. Ideally, it was pure evidence, unequivocal in its interpretation, and irresistible in its persuasive power. The evidence of miracles straddled the distinction between the "internal" evidence of things and the "external" evidence of testimony, a distinction that was to dominate later debates over the evidence for miracles in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.72 The evidence of miracles was internal, insofar as it was a thing or event. Moreover, its internal evidence, read off from the very nature of the event, was of a special sort, pointing unmistakably to supernatural agency, just as fingerprints point to a certain hand. At the same time, the evidence of miracles was external, a form of testimony from God that the miracle-worker's message was an authentic revelation. In both cases, the evidence of miracles was saturated with intention, God's intention to suspend the natural order to certify his messenger, and God's intention to establish certain doctrines. Because miracles accompanied doctrine, their meaning was clear; because God was the author of miracles, they proved beyond a shadow of a doubt.
However, the faith in pure evidence was short lived. The evidentiary theologians soon became preoccupied with the question, "What distinguished a true miracle from a false one?" Definitions of miracles proliferated in the late seventeenth century, as theologians and natural philosophers groped for some clear-cut criterion. The very number and diversity of these definitions testifies to their failure to find such. Almost every imaginable position found a supporter; a few examples from major writers suffice to suggest the breadth of opinion and the lack of agreement.
Tillotson asserted a miracle must be a "supernatural Effect," but admitted that since angels and demons can "exceed any natural Power known to us," their works would often be indistinguishable from those of God (WJT, 2:496). Casaubon eluded the problem of distinguishing supernatural and natural effects by reasserting the Augustinian position that there was nothing so ordinary "but, if looked into Philosophically, did Hence Glanvill.required that putative miracles not only exceed the known powers of nature but also be performed by "Persons of Simplicity, Truth, and Holiness, void of Ambition, and all secular Designs" (ST, p. 52). Fleetwood thought it was enough that miracles violated the "setled Laws of Nature," these latter being observationally defined as "Operations that are constant, certain, and expected" (EM, p. 2). Samuel Clarke was more cautious than Fleetwood in qualifying "the Course of Nature" as the "perfectly Arbitrary" workings of divine will, "as easie to be altered at any time, as to be preserved," but also opted for a rarity criterion: "'tis only usualness or unusualness that makes the distinction."74 John Locke faced these epistemological difficulties squarely, and retreated to the subjective appreciation of the miracle, defined as a "sensible operation, which, being above the comprehension of the spectator, and in his opinion contrary to the established course of nature, is taken by him to be divine." 75 These definitions were always convoluted and often circular or selfcontradictory to boot. Only the intensity of the desire for such a hard-andfast criterion can explain the willingness to wrestle with definitions that could not command internal consistency, much less consensus. What drove these writers into the definitional quagmire was the threat of false miracles; what altered in the course of the debate was not the fear of being deceived, but rather the identity of the suspected deceiver.
Increasingly in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the enemy was the enthusiast rather than the devil. In the middle decades of the seventeenth century, the devil was still a force to reckon with: Browne contended that Satan counterfeited miracles to spread idolatry and superstition; 76 The deep-seated anxiety about imposture, both diabolical and human, was simply the obverse of the emphasis on miracles as evidence. For the evidentiary theologians, the truth of Christian revelation was chiefly supported "by the many infallible Signs and Miracles, which the Author of it worked publickly as the Evidence of his Divine Commission" (D, p. 372).79 Miracles were God's signature, "the greatest testimony of Divine authority and revelation" (OS, p. 139). However, in contrast to most testimonial evidence, what must be proved is not the trustworthiness but rather the identity of the witness, for once God's identity was established, absolute trustworthiness followed necessarily for seventeenth-century theologians.80 Since belief in revelation and, conversely, rejection of heresy was in their view the gravest of human duties, no pain should be spared in distinguishing divine signatures from forgeries. Fleetwood went so far as to make the miracle itself subsidiary to the signature, advising his readers that "you are under no obligation of Necessity, to believe all that a Man shall say, who works Miracles, without declaring he is sent of God, and telling you, that God has given him that miraculous Power, in order to obtain Credit with you" (EM, p. 117). Confident that God always provides "sufficient marks" for the "impartial Enquirers after Truth" to distinguish true from false miracles (WJT, 2:499), the theologians sought the signs that would validate the "Signs and Wonders." The claim that miracles were irrefutable evidence thus led willy-nilly to the demand for still further evidence that the miracles in question were genuine.
The clinching evidence for the authenticity of an ambiguous miracle was doctrinal. As we have seen, both the objective criterion of supernatural causation and the subjective criterion of wonder dissolved under the scrutiny of seventeenth-century theologians: too little was known of nature to locate the boundary between natural and supernatural causes, The evidentialists were well aware of the potential circularity of this criterion, but insisted that the tautology was only apparent. Pascal summed up the problem in a laconic "Regle": "One must judge doctrine by miracles, and one must judge miracles by doctrine. All of this is true, but not contradictory. For it is necessary to distinguish the times [distinguer les temps]."82 The English evidentialists wriggled out of the difficulty by arguing that it was only the kind of doctrine which had to pass muster, not the specifics of its content. The doctrine must be inaccessible to human reason, for otherwise it need not be vouchsafed as revelation; moreover, it must not tend to promote idolatry and other impieties: "If the Doctrine attested by Miracles, be in it self impious, or manifestly tending to promote Vice; then without all question the Miracles, how great soever they may appear to Us, are neither worked by God himself, nor by his Commission" (D, p. 382). However, the elasticity of the term impious, which could be stretched to encompass all that contradicted a particular orthodoxy, blurred the boundary between kind and content of miracles that the evidentialists had hoped would protect them from tautology.
In cases of contested doctrine, the evidentiary import of the miracle, even one universally acknowledged to be genuine, was effectively neutralized by competing interpretations. When for example Pascal's niece was cured of a lachrymal fistula by contact with a thorn from the crown of Jesus on 24 March 1656, even the most bitter opponents of the Port-Royal Jansenists submitted to the official decision certifying the miracle as authentic. But whereas Pascal and his allies took the miracle as a divine vindication, their Jesuit critics argued that it was a divine warning to forsake their heresy.83 The miracle remained a divine sign, but an inscrutable one.
The end result of the doctrinal criterion was to weaken dramatically the evidentiary force of miracles. Miracles alone, no matter how public and palpable to the senses, no longer sufficed to prove a doctrine or messenger heaven-sent. The reaffirmation of political and religious authority reflected in the official dismissal of unsettling portents and miracles on both sides of the Channel had its theological analogue in the centralization of divine power, especially in Protestant writings. Both the natural and, particularly, the preternatural domains lost territory as a result. Robert Boyle attacked natural philosophers who granted nature an unseemly amount of autonomy by endowing it with plastic powers and capricious deviations; nature was simply brute, passive matter set in motion and sustained by God.94 Neither mechanistic nor Newtonian natural philosophy necessarily promoted nature's independence and the inviolability of natural law. As Clarke put it in his Boyle lectures of 1705, "what Men commonly call the Course of Nature, or the Power of Nature" is simply the "Will of God" which "is as easie to be altered at any time, as to be preserved" (D, p. 377).
The preternatural had depended crucially on insubordination to divine decree, both nature's and the devil's, and therefore virtually disappeared as a result of God's new, tightened regime. Although few went so far as to deny the devil's existence, he was, like nature, put on a very short leash. Clarke thought God could at least partially restrain evil spirits (see D, p. 391), and Fleetwood essentially demoted the devil to God's lieutenant, "for his Power or Impotence, it depends entirely on God, how far he will restrain or limit him" (EM, p. 50). By granting God a monopoly on agency in the universe, late seventeenth-century Protestant theologians, at least English ones, radically simplified ontology as well. Spinoza's pantheistic critique of miracles was a scandal because it merged God with nature, but the simplifying ontological tendencies of the Tractatus theologico-politicus (1670), as well as the contempt for the low understanding of the "masses," were echoed in numerous, more orthodox works. the writings of the natural theologians appealed to the desire for a calm religious life, free from nasty surprises and inspired upstarts.
Scientific facts also became more regular and more commonplace, although the transition from bizarre singularities to mundane universals was a gradual and uneven one.99 However, even after scientific facts had been domesticated, the distinction between facts and evidence remained part of the conceptual framework of natural science, often contested (starting with Descartes and continuing to the present day) but never completely extirpated. Long after scientific facts ceased to be the anomalies and exceptions Bacon used to destroy Aristotelian axioms and natural kinds, they retained their reputation for orneriness. The portentous-signturned-scientific-fact left deeply etched traces in our way of thinking about evidence. In contrast, the contributions of the evidentiary miracle were not so long lived. Before worries first over demonic counterfeits and later over human enthusiasm reduced miracles to rubber-stamping extant doctrine, miracles seemed the purest form of evidence: their meaning was patent to all who had eyes to see, and they compelled belief as irresistibly as a mathematical demonstration-indeed, more so, since they required neither the training nor the concentration of a mathematician. Miracles were God's privy seal and letters patent, certifying a doctrine as divine and thereby convincing onlookers of its truth. Ideally, miracles were transparent, requiring no interpretation, and were as satisfying to the senses and to the imagination as to reason.
This dream of pure evidence evaporated with the division of evidence into the internal evidence of things and the external evidence of testimony, which division structured the debate over the evidencefor miracles.100 The pure evidence of miracles, at least as conceived in the midseventeenth century, straddled the line between internal and external evidence: as sensible events miracles belonged to the realm of things, but as supernatural events they also bore witness. They were the last form of evidence compatible with intention, in this case divine intention, and it is ironic that suspicions of human intention-that is, the intent to feign miracles in order to usurp political and religious authority-ultimately deprived them of evidentiary value. 
